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Abstract
Trade-related measures aim to regulate side-eects in international environmental
agreements and are expected to positively in
uence the level of participation in the
agreements as well as their degree of stability. In this paper we examine one side-
eect of the 1994 International Tropical Timber Agreement - its impact on tropical
timber trade. We use a cross-sectional dataset on bilateral trade 
ows of tropical
timber that additionally contains information on trading partners' economic and ge-
ographical characteristics. Our empirical specication is based on a gravity equation,
which is estimated using Heckman's selection model to address the potentially sys-
tematic selection of trading partners. We nd signicantly positive impacts of the
1994 ITTA on member countries' level of tropical timber trade. Furthermore, poor
exporter countries benet more from this trade enhancing eect than their richer
counterparts.
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11 Introduction
The accession of countries to an international environmental agreement not only
aects the provision of an (global) environmental good, but also has an impact on
various other issues. For example, in international trade relations it may shift the
comparative advantage of the pollution-intensive industries in regulated countries
to those in unregulated ones. Trade measures, which are regularly linked to inter-
national environmental agreements, aim to dampen these undesirable side-eects
and are expected to positively in
uence the level of participation in and the sta-
bility of international environmental agreements. Despite the theoretic evidence of
the importance of international environmental agreements containing trade related
measures on the provision of global public goods, only few studies examine these
issues econometrically.
Here is where our study starts. We analyze the eect of the 1994 International
Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA) on international trade of tropical timber (TT).
First, we ask whether ITTA in
uences the rms' decision in the exporter country
to serve a foreign market with TT well as the respective volume. This question
is motivated by a recent article by Rose & Spiegel (2009) who demonstrate that
non-economic exchange (e.g. political relations) between countries increases the
likelihood of engaging in economic exchanges. Second, we decompose the eect of
1994 ITTA for dierent subsamples referring to their economic endowment to get
an insight into the distribution of the agreement's eect across specic groups of
countries. This is of particular interest as these distributional issues are frequently
the reason of con
icts in international environmental negotiations.
To answer these research questions we rely on a theoretical model by Hallak
(2010) who considers the relevance of quality parameters in determining bilateral
trade 
ows. The econometric specication is based on a gravity equation which is
estimated using the Heckman sample selection model to control for the potential
systematic selection of countries into the group of tropical wood traders. We nd
that due to the linked trade measures countries participating in ITTA form an ex-
clusive club, in which the trade intensity of TT rises signicantly in comparison with
countries outside the club. These impacts occur even though we control for the eect
of preferential trade agreements between the countries as well as potential leakage
eects that may in
uence the trade of TT of non-participating countries. With re-
spect to the distribution of the agreement's impact on TT trade between importers
and exporters that dier in their economic endowment we nd that poor exporters
benet most by signing the ITTA. This result contradicts the frequently mentioned
2concerns that developing countries are negatively aected by trade-related measures
in international environmental agreements. Even more, this impact points to the
possibility for convergence in trade volumes between rich and poor exporters, which
would consequently increase the stability of the agreement.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst study which empirically exam-
ines the trade eects of an international environmental agreement containing trade
related measures. The quantication of such eects is important to compare the re-
sulting benets with the other benets and costs that the agreement induces and to
determine its net benets and distribution among the participating as well as non-
participating countries. Knowledge of the distribution of this impact across countries
makes future negotiations on international environmental agreements more ecient.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we will introduce
the international environmental agreement of our interest, the International Tropical
Timber Agreement. Furthermore, we will give a brief literature overview on inter-
national environmental agreements and discuss the concept of linking trade-related
measures in international environmental agreements in more detail. In section 3 we
will describe our theoretical and empirical approach to analyze the trade eects of
an international environmental agreement. In section 4 we will present our data and
in section 5 we will discuss our results. The last section concludes.
2 Background and previous literature
2.1 The International Tropical Timber Agreement
In 1983, following a growing public debate on the problems of the substantial degra-
dation and destruction of the world's forests, an international environmental agree-
ment on management and trade of TT { the so called International Tropical Timber
Agreement { was signed originally by 36 producer and 34 consumer countries and
entered into force three years later. Under the agreement the International Tropical
Timber Organization (ITTO) with its decision-making and recommendatory body,
the International Tropical Timber Council, was established. The ITTA's primary
objective is the protection of natural tropical forests from destruction, degradation
and excision. Furthermore, the agreement aims at promoting TT trade by providing
a platform that eases the communication between producers and consumers.
Until now the original agreement was renegotiated two times, in 1994 as well as in
2006. While the 1983 ITTA was originally designed as a commodity-based agreement
with emphasis on strengthening the members' TT markets, the 1994 ITTA included
3the `ITTO Objective 2000' and the Bali Partnership Fund. These two measures
have increased the importance of the primary objective - the sustainable use of the
forest resource - substantially by implementing forest certication schemes, devel-
oping criteria and indicators for sustainable management, introducing community
forestry schemes and making harvesting data of tropical wood more transparent.
The 1994 ITTA is signed by 65 member countries whereof the producing member
countries possess about 80 percent of the world's tropical forests. The succeeding
2006 ITTA, which is not into force yet, still aims at supporting sustainable tropical
forest management and TT markets.
2.2 Previous literature
Today, environmental issues with transboundary impact, like ozone depletion, pollu-
tion of oceans and rivers, overexploitation of natural resources and deforestation of
world's forests, are addressed in numerous international environmental agreements.
Success or failure of such agreements often depend on both the participation and the
compliance behavior of the involved countries. Many international environmental
agreements share the following features, which restrain their success.
First, their main objective is the provision of a public good, which leads to collec-
tive action problems. Second, since states are sovereign in their decision to provide
the public good or to free-ride on the others countries' behavior, international envi-
ronmental agreements have to be self-enforcing (Barrett 1994).
Third, such agreements regularly bring countries together, which dier in their
economic, institutional and ecologic endowment and therefore, share the benets
and costs of abatement asymmetrically. This is a major problem in the negotiations
of international environmental agreements containing trade related measures. For
this reason, developing countries often resist strongly to accede to these kind of
international environmental agreements. Commonly, they argue that they may not
be able to aord a raise in their environmental standards and that these trade
measures will have a negative economic impact on them as a result of restrictions in
market access through certication requirements, performance mandates, conformity
assessments and labeling standards (Brack & Gray 2003, Qiu & Zhihao 2009).
Fourth, international environmental agreements regularly interact with other
markets in many dierent ways. Suppose, for example that a country' s production
is more costly due to its participation in an international environmental agreement.
Then, the comparative advantage of the pollution-intensive industries will shift to
non-participating countries and the world price will change. In particular, the non-
4participating countries will increase their output of the dirty good leading to a
situation in which the provision of the global public good is less than the initial level
of provision undertaken by the participating countries (Copeland & Taylor 2005).
This phenomenon is known as leakage eect. Furthermore, leakage increases the
incentive to free-ride if the free-riders' benets from consumption of the public good
that complying countries provide are suciently large. Providing a credible set of
specic sanctions for non-complying and non-participating countries can reduce or
even eliminate leakage eects (Barrett 1997). Trade related measures enable the
member countries to observe the compliant behavior of their trading partners. This
increased market transparency creates peer pressure to comply with the agreements
obligations as non-compliant countries may face a worsening of their international
relationships.
To overcome these problems, the literature on international environmental agree-
ments suggests rearranging the incentive structure so that instable coalition part-
ners join the agreement and comply with the agreement's obligations (Barrett &
Stavins 2003). This can be done for instance by linking dierent policy issues.1 Al-
ternative measures in
uencing the incentive structure of international environmental
agreement discussed in the literature are a minimum participation clause (Carraro,
Marchiori & Orece 2009, Barrett 1998), in-kind and cash transfers (Carraro &
Siniscalco 1993, Hoel & Schneider 1997, Barrett 2001), uniform emission reduction
quotas (Endres & Finus 2002, Finus 2003) and sanctions (Barrett & Stavins 2003).2
Since the early 1990s, the literature about the eects of dierent policy measures
on the formation and stability of international environmental agreements has grown
continuously. While this literature mainly uses game theoretic approaches, only a
few studies investigate these issues systematically in an econometric framework.3
The majority of the empirical contributions to the literature on international en-
vironmental agreements deals with the participation decision of countries and the
1 See for example Barrett (1997), Barrett (2006), Carraro & Siniscalco (1997), Hoel & de Zeeuw
(2010).
2 For an overview on the existing literature and an excellent discussion see for instance Wagner
(2001) or Finus (2008).
3 Another strand of literature examines the success of international environmental agreements
in reaching the specied environmental target. Murdoch & Sandler (1997) and Murdoch, Sandler
& Sargent (1997) evaluated the eects of the Montreal Protocol on CFC emissions and the Oslo
Protocol sulphur emissions respectively. Their results suggest that the cooperative gains are not
signicant higher than the non-cooperative gains. Finus & Tjtta (2003) examining the 1994 Oslo
Protocol, Bratberg, Tjtta & Torgeir (2005) evaluating the impact of the 1988 Soa Protocol and
Aakvika & Tjtta (2011) analyzing the 1985 Helsinki Protocol and the 1994 Oslo Protocol could
determine cooperative gains compared to the non-cooperative outcome.
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uencing this decision (Murdoch, Sandler & Vijverberg 2003, Beron, Mur-
doch & Vijverberg 2003, Fredriksson, Neumayer & Ujhelyi 2007).
In a recent article, Rose & Spiegel (2009) theoretically demonstrate that non-
economic exchange between countries increases the likelihood of engaging in eco-
nomic exchanges. This arises from the fact that non-economic engagement, rst,
can signal a higher level of trustworthiness and, second, provides the possibility of
punishing the partner in one domain for non-cooperation in the other domain. In a
further step, they nd empirical support that countries with a greater participation
in international environmental agreements also have higher trade in nancial assets.
They conclude that non-cooperative behavior is costly for countries due to the lost
of such indirect benets. In contrast to Rose & Spiegel (2009), in this work the link
between the agreement's impact and the commodity exchange is much tighter as we
focus on the specic goods the agreement explicitly refers to (i.e. trade in TT).
2.3 Trade-Related Measures in International Environmen-
tal Agreements
Trade-related measures are only one part of a range of instruments designed to
increase the formation and stability of multilateral agreements. Today they are
integrated in a great number of international environmental agreements on a wide
range of topics. Examples are the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, the Convention on International Trade of
Endangered Species and the agreement of our interest, the 1994 ITTA, promoting
the sustainable management of tropical forests, the development of tropical forest
industries through international cooperation and the international trade in TT.4
Trade-related measures help to improve the participation in and compliance with
international environmental agreements, if markets are imperfect and distorted by
asymmetries, if policy failures have to be corrected for or if strong incentives to
free-riding and leakage exists. Furthermore, they provide a possibility of monitor-
ing and controlling trade in products, in which otherwise unregulated trade would
contribute to environmental damage, like in the Convention on International Trade
of Endangered Species or the ITTA.5
4 For an detailed overview and discussion of international environmental agreements contain-
ing trade-related measures see WTO, Matrix on Trade Measures Pursuant to Selected MEAs,
WT/CTE/W/160/Rev.1(2001).
5 For a general analysis and discussion of trade-related measures in international environmental
agreements see Brack & Gray (2003) or Homann (2004).
6Trade related measures vary widely and include on the one hand specic report-
ing, labeling or other identications requirements, like movement documents and
on the other hand more invasive forms, like general and targeted import/export
bans and market transformation measures, like taris, subsidies or other forms of
scal measures (Brack & Gray 2003). Invasive forms provide an instrument of
rst, punishing non-cooperative behavior of participating countries, and second, re-
ducing the comparative advantage of non-participating countries and in this way
easing the problem of leakage. To in
uence behavior, these threatened punishments
must be both credible and suciently severe (Barrett & Stavins 2003). But these
requirements are dicult to fulll, because every punishment harms cooperating
as well as non-cooperating countries. Furthermore, due to the fact that countries
interact on various issues and through numerous channels applications of trade re-
strictions can be limited, for example in cases where trade restrictions violate the
non-discrimination provision of the GATT/WTO agreement (Barrett 1997). There-
fore, trade-related measures in international environmental agreements are usually
part of a package of measures that include non-invasive measures, like reporting,
labeling and information requirements, non-trade measures, like quotas, and sup-
portive measures which can be nancial and technical support, training and R&D
linkages (Homann 2004). The 1994 ITTA consists of non-invasive measures, like
increasing market transparency, providing trade and price data, reducing market
distorting illegal logging practices or providing a platform for producers and con-
sumers of tropical wood. Additionally, supportive measures have been included
by introducing the Bali Partnership Fund, which allocates nancial assistance to
ITTA-producer countries to implement a more sustainable management of TT.
3 Theoretical model and empirical specication
3.1 Theoretical framework
We base our theoretical model for TT on the arguments given in Anderson & van
Wincoop (2003), Hallak (2010) and Anderson & Yotov (2010). Accordingly, we
assume that the demand for country i's tropical wood exports to country j, xij, are
based on a monopolistic competition model with CES-preferences. For each of the
ni tropical wood extracting rms (varieties) in country i the demand function in


















 > 1 and denotes the elasticity of substitution, which is constant and uniform
across countries. ij represents iceberg-type transportation costs. Following Hallak
(2010), i is a (environmental) quality indicator for production, 
j stands for the
intensity of the consumers' preference for (environmental) quality. Yj denes the
expenditures on wood products which are a fraction  of GDP Yj. Mark-up pricing
of rms in country i leads to mills prices
pi = 
 1ci; (2)
where ci stands for marginal costs of wood production, which are assumed to be the
same for all rms in a country.
The crucial determinant in this analysis is the role of product (environmental)
quality, pictured by 

j
i , in trading TT. To keep the model simple we assume that
the supply of higher environmental quality is associated with higher xed costs but
does not eect the variable costs. As Hallak (2010), we suppose that demand and
supply for environmental quality is positively related to both, the log of real income
per-capita of the suppliers, yi, and the consumers, yj. Additionally, we assume that
the supply of and demand for environmental qualitative TT products is higher for
countries that signed the 1994 ITTA. Specically, i and 





j = Dj + yj:
so that after taking logs one obtains

j lni = (Dj + yj)(Dik + yi)
= kDjDi + Dikyj + Djyi + yjyi
(3)
We dene Di = 0 whenever an exporter is not an ITTA-member, i.e. only supplies
a base quality. Di = 1 indicates that the exporter provides a higher environmental
quality due to its ITTA status. Similarly, Dj = 1 (Dj = 0) if the importing country
is (not) part of the 1994 ITTA. This formulation implies that the trading partners'
8ITTA status as well as their GDP/capita in
uences quality demand and supply.
We argue that rich countries tend to consume products with a high environmental
quality in the sense that their willingness to pay for quality level i, captured by 
j,
is higher the richer the people in the importing country are. In addition, signing
the 1994 ITTA (Dj = 1) as an importer country reveals its preference for higher
environmental quality. Also, rich countries are more able to supply high environ-
mental quality and if they sign the 1994 ITTA as a supplier (Di = 1) they will
provide higher environmental quality as compared to the base level. The base ef-
fect, i.e. Di = 0 and Dj = 0, is solely determined by the exporters' and importers'
GDP/capita, i.e., yi and yj. As Hallak (2010) shows, this term can be used to test
the Linder hypothesis which suggests that countries with similar GDP/capita trade
more intensively with each other. Depending on the trading partners' status of their
ITTA-membership and their GDP/capita, we observe four dierent combinations of
















i ) = yjyi + Djyi + Dikyj + kDjDi if Di = 1 and Dj = 1
(4)
Considering that countries may systematically select into the group of TT traders,
we end up with two crucial equations upon which the econometric specication can
be based.6 The rst equation refers to the nominal value of TT exports of country
i to country j, Xij:
lnXij = (1   )lnij + (   1)
j lni + ln(jP
 1







if Vij = 1 and 0 otherwise
(5)
Equation (5) indicates that the value of bilateral TT trade is increasing in product
quality, in demand for quality, in income and in the trade resistance terms which
cover the average prices on the demand and supply side. TT trade is decreasing the
higher the transportation costs are. However, trade in TT can be only observed, if
exporter i serves the import market j, i.e. if Vij = 1.
The second equations models Vij. Following the literature, we assume free entry
of suppliers into the import markets at xed costs (fij) which drives prots down to
6 A detailed discussion of the theoretical motivation is given in the Appendix.
9zero. Based on this zero prot condition and under the assumption that exporter
prots are separable across destination countries one may dene a latent variable
(V 
ij) that captures the propensity of exporter country i to serve import market j.
In our model we specify the latent variable as
V

















and dene the indicator variable Vij taking the value 1 if exports from country i to
j are observed and 0 otherwise. This specication is obtained by normalizing the
zero prot condition of rms exporting from country i to j by the operating prots
earned in the domestic market (see Appendix). It implies that exports from i to j
are more likely observed the lower the trade barriers ij and the xed trade costs
fij are. Note, the importer trade resistance terms Pj (Pi) aect the propensity to
export since a higher average price level in a market increases the operating prots
earned there.
Concluding, the participation in ITTA does not only in
uence the magnitude
of the trade 
ows (internal margin) but also the decision of an exporter to serve a
foreign market at all (external margin).
3.2 Econometric specication
The structural gravity equation discussed shortly above and derived in the Appendix
motivates to estimate a Heckman-sample selection model (Heckman 1976) with ex-
porter and importer dummies. These dummies capture all determinants that are
either importer or exporter specic. In particular, in the trade 
ow equation the
dummies cover the trade resistance terms ln(jP
 1


















The econometric model estimated below pools over four product classes indexed
by z. We substitute 
j lni in equation (5) by equation (3) and add a stochastic
disturbance term. Then, country i's nominal exports to country j of products z,
Xijz, can be described as follows
lnXijz = a0 + a1(lnyj   lnyi)
2 + a2Dj lnyi + a3Di lnyj + a4DjDi
+ a5ij + ci + mj + pz + ijz
(7)
yj (yi) represents the importer's (exporter's) GDP/capita. Dj (Di) describes the
country's ITTA membership and equals one when the importer (exporter) acceded
10to the 1994 ITTA, DjDi is one if both trading partners signed the ITTA. (lnyj lnyi)
stands for the Linder term and measures the distance in the countries' GDP/capita.7
 comprises the bilateral trade barrier variables. In particular, it includes regional
trade agreements (RTA) in force, the log of geographical distance (measured in
km) between the countries' main cities, and dummies for having a common border,
colonial relationship, common colonizer and common language. Finally, ci, mj and
pz capture exporter, importer and product xed eects and  represents the error
term.
We expect a positive sign on a2, a3 and a4 indicating that high preferences for
environmental quality together with the provision of environmentally qualitative
goods increase the nominal value of TT trade. According to the Linder Hypothe-
sis, a1 should be negative as countries that are dissimilar in their GDP/capita are
expected to trade less intensively with each other.
As highlighted above, one has to control for the systematic selection of countries
into the group of TT traders. The parameterization of participation in TT trade is
based on equation (6). Since xed trade costs remain unobserved, we use the same
explanatory variables as in the trade 
ows equation as theory does not provide
observable bilateral indicators that would dene exclusion restrictions.8
lnV

ijz = b0 + b1(lnyj   lnyi)
2 + b2Dj lnyi + b3Di lnyj + b4DjDi
+ b5ij + ci + mj + pz + ijz
(8)
Finally, we want to emphasize that we do not consider the endogeneity of the
ITTA dummy variables as an important issue in our context. The reason is that a
country's decision to signing up the ITTA either as exporter or importer is unilateral.
In other words, the countries' ITTA status does not refer to a specic bilateral
relationship but pictures a unilateral decision. Therefore a countrie's ITTA status
can be seen as an exogenous treatment in bilateral setting where endogeneity is
related to disturbances varying at the bilateral level. To justify this statement, we
tested for the endogeneity of the ITTA status among the TT traders (i.e. ignoring
zero trades) and nd support for the exogenous treatment assumption.
7Note, that the squared log dierence in the countries GDP/capita can be derived from ln yj lnyi
considering that lnyj lnyi = 0:5lny2
j +0:5lny2
i  0:5(lnyj  lnyi)2. y2
j and y2
i are captured in the
importer and exporter xed eects.
8Cameron & Trivedi (2005), Chapter 16.5.5., show that the model is identied without exclusion
restrictions but the identication may be weak if the t of the probit model is poor. In our case,
these identication problems seem not to be an issue.
114 The data
4.1 Data description and modication
The data stems from a number of sources. Information on bilateral TT imports
are taken from the UN's commodity trade statistic database, which reports trade
data up to a 6 digit classication of products. In particular, we examine nominal
trade 
ows of TT9. We refer to the Harmonized Commodity Description and Cod-
ing System 1996 (HS1996) which classies TT into 10 dierent codes (for a detail
denition, see Table A2 in the Appendix) and covers a period of 13 years (1996 to
2008). Geographical information (distance between the trading partners, common
language, contiguity, colonial linkages) is taken form the CEPII data base. Data
on the trading partners' GDP/capita stem from the World Development Indicators
2009 compiled by the World Bank. Regional trade agreements in force are taken
from Baier, Bergstrand, Egger & McLaughlin (2008) and from the WTO's Regional
Trade Agreements Information System10. Our crucial independent variable, the sta-
tus of a country's ITTA membership, is dened through Annex A and Annex B of
the 1994 International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA 1994).
Unfortunately, for some trading partners only a few observations per product
class and year are available. We therefore average our sample over time and 4-digit
classes (instead of using the 6-digit classication). As the set of countries that trade
TT may systematically dier from the countries that do not trade, we start with
a sample of all exporter and importer countries that reported at least one trade

ow. We drop exporters that are not tropical countries as they { by denition {
cannot produce tropical wood (but rather represent intermediary trade partners).
We are left with a sample of 47,628 observations whereof about 10 % (i.e., 4,753
observations) include information on TT trade, i.e. imports in TT > 0.
4.2 Descriptive statistics
As shown in the Table 1, the average value of TT imported amounts to 742,500 US$.
The average GDP/capita (measured in constant year 2000 US$) of the importers is
more than twice as large as the average GDP/capita of the exporting country. The
average distance between the two trading partner is about 8,700 km and only 2 %
of the trading partners share a common border. In 20 % of the observations the
9 According to ITTA, TT is dened as non-coniferous tropical wood for industrial uses, which
grows or is produced in the countries situated between the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of
Capricorn. This denition involve logs, veneer sheets, sawnwood and plywood (ITTA 1994).
10http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx
12trading partner have their language in common, in about 14 % they have (had) a
commom colonizer and in about 1% they have (had) colonial links. Regional trade
agreements are in force between 18 % of the trading partners and in about 40 % of
all observations one of the trading partners have signed the 1994 ITTA. Finally, in
15 % of the observations both, exporter as well as importer, are ITTA members.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Imports (in 1,000 US$) 4753 742:526 10150:280 0:004 594300
GDP/capita (importer) 47628 7221:197 9859:441 110:310 47608
GDP/capita (exporter) 47628 3250:131 4886:590 110:281 26698
Distance (in km) 47628 8694:206 4451:390 105:181 19904
Contiguity 47628 0:016 0:127 0 1
Com. language 47628 0:203 0:402 0 1
Colonial link 47628 0:008 0:087 0 1
Com. Colonizer 47628 0:137 0:344 0 1
Regional trade agreements 47628 0:184 0:387 0 1
ITTA (importer) 47628 0:385 0:487 0 1
ITTA (exporter) 47628 0:395 0:489 0 1
ITTAimp*ITTAexp 47628 0:150 0:358 0 1
148 importing and 81 exporting countries are involved in trading TT. Table 2
lists the ten largest importers and exporters with respect to the aggregated value
of TT imported. All of these countries, except for Belgium, have signed the 1994
ITTA. As Table 2 highlights, Japan is by far the largest importer of TT and spends
more than one billion US$ on TT. The United States and China rank second and
third, respectively. India and Malaysia are the two most important supplier followed
by Gabon whose exports are only about one third in value.
Table 3 presents the trade 
ows in TT in percent of the total import value
for each continent pair. About 50 % of the total TT trade occurs within Asia.
Trade 
ows from Africa to Europe (Asia to Europe) rank second (third) but are
considerably lower, namely 15 % (9 %). The fourth most important destination for
TT originated in Asia are the United states accounting for a proportion of 8 %.
The remaining exporter-importer combinations are with respect to the import value
as well as quantity imported of minor relevance. Overall, Asia accounts for 56 %,
Europe for 26 % and North America for 13 % of the total import value of TT. The
largest exporters (ranked by the import value of TT) are Asia, Africa and South
America whose shares amount to 67 %, 24 % and 7 %, respectively.
Table 4 compares the trade 
ows across countries that signed or did not signed
the 1994 ITTA. Among the four subgroups, the group where both trading partners
13Table 2: Largest importers and exporters of TT
(ranked by aggregated value importeda)
Importers Exporters
of tropical timber trade (codes 4403, 4407, 4408, 4412)
Japan 1063 India 1122
United States 362 Malaysia 922
China 274 Gabon 310
Republic of Korea 235 Cameroon 261
Italy 145 China 187
France 143 Brazil 135
India 113 Cote d'Ivoire 135
Germany 104 Ghana 83
Netherlands 94 Ecuador 31
Belgium 92 Peru 30
Notes: a Sum of TT imports/exports (in million US$).
Table 3: Trade 
ows in TT in % of import value
Exporter
Importer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Total
TT, overall import value: 3,529 mill. USD
(1) Africa 1.98 6.61 0.05 14.54 1.06 0.05 24.29
(2) Asia 1.47 47.54 0.71 8.78 8.21 0.12 66.84
(3) Australia 0.01 0.16 0.05 0.05 0.09 { 0.35
(4) Europe { { { { { { {
(5) North America 0.01 0.53 0.00 0.18 0.46 0.01 1.18
(6) South America 0.06 1.47 0.05 2.10 3.00 0.65 7.33
Total 3.530 56.31 0.86 25.65 12.82 0.83 100.00
Notes: Figures are based on the aggregate bilateral trade 
ows for the prod-
uct classes 4403, 4407, 4408 and 4412. `{' indicates that no bilateral trade

ows occurred between these regions; `0.00' means that bilateral trade is of
minor value (smaller than a one-hundredth of a percent).
assigned the 1994 ITTA, accounts for 84 % of total trade 
ows. Second rank those
countries where the exporter but not the importer is an ITTA member but the
respective trade share is considerably lower (13 %) than for the former group.
Clearly, this huge dierence may result from various factors that are unrelated
to the countries' ITTA status. The following section aims at analyzing the trade

ows in more detail and to focus on the role of ITTA assignments for the nominal
value of TT trade.
14Table 4: Trade 
ows in TT in % of




TT, overall import value: 3,529 mill. USD
(1) no ITTA 1.03 2.13 3.15
(2) ITTA 12.87 83.98 96.85
Total 13.90 86.10 100.00
Notes: Figures are based on the aggregate
bilateral trade 
ows for the product classes
4403, 4407, 4408 and 4412.
5 The estimation results
Our results are based on the econometric specications derived in Section 3.2. As
argued, we control for potential selection among trading partners by implementing
Heckman's two-step estimator. The respective output is given in Table 5 and shows
the selection and outcome equation.
Table 5: Trade 
ows in TT { estimation results
Heckman's selection model
Independent variable selection outcome
DiDj 0:105 0:518
Di  lnyj 0:112 0:159
Dj  lnyi  0:011  0:094










Product class eects 1403.36
Exporter and importer eects 6844.38
Notes: Constant and xed eects not reported. ,  and 
indicate 10%, 5% and 1% levels of signicance.
15Table 5 highlights that distance signicantly determines the probability of tak-
ing part in TT trading. In particular, the probability decreases with increasing
geographical distance (measured in km2) and is higher for countries that share a
common border, have a common language or have (had) colonial relationships. We
also nd strong evidence that the existence of a regional trade agreement makes it
more likely that countries trade with each other. With respect to the 1994 ITTA
and the countries' GDP/capita (i.e., our proxies for environmental quality) we nd
that the probability of trading is higher if both trading partners acceded to the 1994
ITTA. While the probability further increases in GDP/capita of the importer, given
that the exporter signed the 1994 ITTA, the exporter's GDP/capita does not make
positive trade 
ows more likely. Finally, the quadratic log dierence in the countries'
GDP/capita indicates that the probability of trading is higher for trading partners
that diverge with respect to their GDP/capita.
Which eect do we nd for the nominal value of trade 
ows? First of all, the
signicant mills ratio shown in the Heckman specication provides evidence that
systematic selection is an issue and has to be controlled for to achieve reliable es-
timates. With respect to the in
uence of the distance parameters we nd similar
eects as in the selection regression with the exception that RTAs in force increase
the probability of trading but do not aect the level of TT trade.
With respect to the environmental quality indicators we nd that the base ef-
fect, the coecient on the Linder term (i.e., quadratic log dierence in the trading
partner's GDP/capita), supports the Linder hypothesis which supposes that coun-
tries with dissimilar production and consumption patterns trade less intensely with
each other. The positive and highly signicant coecient on DiDj indicates higher
trade 
ows if both trading partners approved the 1994 ITTA. Given that the ex-
porter signed the 1994 ITTA, TT shipments rise with increasing GDP/capita of the
importer. While the exporter's GDP/capita does not in
uence the probability of
trading, its interaction with the importer's ITTA status is signicantly negative in
the outcome equation indicating lower trade 
ows with increasing GDP/capita of
the exporter.
The eect of ITTA, captured by DiDj, results from two sources. First, by
agreeing on trade requirements ITTA signatories can reduce their transaction costs.
Second, DiDj also indicates that the importer's preference for environmental quality
is matched by the exporter's qualitative production. As we see, these factors increase
the probability of TT trading as well as its volume. The interactions with the
1994 ITTA assignment dummies and the trading partners GDP/capita also reveal
interesting patterns. The coecient on the rst interaction, the exporter's ITTA
16membership with the importer's GDP/capita, imply that once the exporter exhibits
a qualitatively higher production (i.e., signs the 1994 ITTA), the probability as well
as the magnitude of TT trade is increasing in GDP/capita of the importer. The
second interaction, importer's ITTA status with the exporter's GDP/capita, reveals
that - given the importer acceded to the 1994 ITTA - poor countries are able to
export more than rich exporting countries. This signicant eect is the only one
which does not meet our expectations: Given, that rich exporters have a comparative
advantage in producing high quality goods the importer demands (ITTA member),
we would have expected that the trade 
ows increase with increasing GDP/capita
of the exporter (see Hallak (2010)). One explanation for that nding could be that
richer exporters on average provide better quality and higher quality induces higher
marginal costs. Overall, this may lead to a negative impact of quality increases
on the quantity demanded if the impact of higher quality is outweighed by higher
marginal costs (see Crozet, Head & Mayer (2011)).
Overall, these eects show that ITTA signicantly determines the probability
of positive TT trade 
ows as well as their value. But how would have the trade

ows looked liked in a world with no 1994 ITTA in force? We answer this question
by creating a counterfactual that represents a world where neither the exporter
nor the importer are ITTA signatories, i.e., Di = Dj = 0 and, hence, DjDi = 0.
Using the Heckman estimates shown in Table 5, we predict the conditional means
in TT imports for the country's current ITTA status and compare these values with
the respective output in the counterfactual world. Accordingly, we determine the
dierence in the propensity of trading by comparing the actual with the constructed
situation.
We interpret the estimated eect of ITTA membership analogously to Feenstra
(2002) who analyzed the impact of common borders on the size of bilateral trade

ows. In particular he proofed that the estimated coecient of the border dummy
can be used to calculate border eects on intranational (between the regions in
the US and between the regions in Canada) trade in relation to international trade
(between US regions and Canadian regions). In our context, the change in average
trade 
ows due to the countries' ITTA membership is measured as relation between
the observed versus the counterfactual outcome (i.e. no ITTA membership) of the
ITTA members relative to the corresponding change in the average trade 
ows of
those country pairs, where at least one partner is not an ITTA member. As shown by
Feenstra (2002), this measure pictures the average eect of 1994 ITTA membership
on TT trade relative to trade 
ows of non-members. In this way it is possible to
17account for the fact that agreement membership also aects trade-
ows by non-
member countries, i.e. possible leakage eects of the agreement.
As we are interested in examining potential dierences in the trade eects be-
tween rich and poor traders, we distinguish between four groups of participants:
poor exporter and importer; poor exporter and rich importer; rich exporter and
poor importer and rich exporter and importer. We dene countries as poor (rich) if
their GDP/capita lies below (above) the 25th (75th) percentile. Table 6 shows the
mean eects of the 1994 ITTA membership for all exporters and importers if they
are both ITTA members compared to a situation where only one of them or non of
them signed the ITTA.
Table 6: Trade eects of ITTA membership
Exporter
Change in trade 
owsa Change in propensitya
Importer Importer
Poor Rich Total Poor Rich Total
Poor 32.58 81.13 75.48 5.47 26.42 20.83
Rich 8.72 47.46 44.46 3.46 25.52 18.99
Total 17.77 56.91 53.44 3.99 25.78 19.52
Notes: Poor (rich) country, if country's GDP/capita is below (above)
the 25th (75th) percentile. a Mean dierence in trade 
ows (in %) and
in exporter status (in percentage points) between a situation where
both trading partners are ITTA members compared to a world where
at least one trading partner is not an ITTA member (i.e., DiDj = 0 ).
The impact of the 1994 ITTA on the level of trade is largest if poor exporting
and rich importing countries trade with each other. In this case, TT trade is 81
% higher than if the countries were not signatories. The group of rich exporters
and rich importers (poor exporters and importers) that both signed the ITTA rank
second (third) with an increase of 47 % (33 %) in trade 
ows compared to the coun-
terfactual of no ITTA membership. Overall, poor exporters face an increase of 75
% in TT shipments due to their ITTA-membership while rich importers (exporters)
can enhance their imports by 57 % (44 %). Poor importers experience the modest
rise of 18 % in TT shipments.
Our theoretical and empirical evidence suggest that the 1994 ITTA also deter-
mines the propensity of trading. The respective gures in Table 6 reveal only minor
variation between poor and rich exporters while the dierence between poor and rich
importers is considerable. In particular, the increase in the probability of trading
with rich (poor) importers amounts to about 26 (3 to 5) % points for the poor as well
18as the rich exporters.11 From this follows that the overall increase in the propensity
of trading due to the ITTA membership is highest for rich importers (26 % points)
while rich and poor exporters face a similar rise (about 19 to 21 % points). As with
the trade 
ows, the impact of ITTA is smallest for poor importers (4 % points).
6 Conclusions
This paper examines the impact of the International Tropical Timber Agreement on
the propensity of trading tropical timber and the level of tropical timber shipments.
We use a monopolistic competition setting that allows for implementing environ-
mental quality indicators to derive relevant factors that determine the probability
and level of tropical timber trade. The theoretical model suggests that the envi-
ronmental quality in production and the consumers' preference for environmental
quality determine the probability of trading as well as the level of trade. The model
also motivates the use of Heckman's two-step estimator for the empirical analysis in
order to control for systematic selection of traders.
We use data on bilateral trade 
ows in tropical timber which serves as the de-
pendent variable in this analysis. Environmental quality in production and demand
for environmental quality is pictured by the trading partners' GDP/capita and their
ITTA membership. Information on bilateral distances as well as membership in
preferential trade agreements are included as further control variables.
The estimation results reveal that countries, participating in ITTA, are going to
form an exclusive club, in which the average trade intensity of tropical timber sig-
nicantly rises in comparison with countries outside the club. This impact is strong
enough to emerge even though we control for the eect of preferential trade agree-
ments between the countries as well as potential leakage eects in
uencing the trade
in tropical timber. Furthermore, we picture the distribution of the ITTA's trade im-
pact between importing and exporting countries that dier in their GDP/capita
and nd that poor exporters benet most by signing the agreement. These results
are in contrast with the common argument that trade measures linked to interna-
tional environmental agreements adversely aect developing countries. To conclude,
trade related measures in international environmental agreements have the potential
to decrease undesired side eects, such as asymmetries in trade benets, and may
therefore enhance the agreement's stability.
11Strictly speaking, this eect is just a lower bound as eects on the importer price resistance
terms remain unidentied in a probit model with xed exporter and importer dummies.
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22Appendix
Modeling the probability and level of TT trading
The decision to participate in TT trading depends on the country i's rms operating
prots and their xed costs fij of serving the foreign market j. Note, overall prots
of a country i's rm are assumed to be separable across importing countries. The
prots that a typical country i rm earns in market j are then given by
ij = 1
 1ciijxij   fiji: (A1)
This implies that market j is served by country i whenever ij  0. Since we assume
























































. Based on equation (A2), we can



















Vij = 1 if V

ij > 0 and is unobserved otherwise
(A3)
Following Anderson & van Wincoop (2003), one can aggregate the value of the
varieties that are produced in country i to obtain the total value of wood production
denoted by Qi. Using the condition that the expenditures on wood originating
from country i aggregated over all the importing countries has to be equal to the














































i=1 Qi = Y: Using equations (A4a), (A4b) and (A4c), the total imports of






















































































Taking logs of (A5), we obtain
lnXij = (1   )lnij + (   1)
j lni + ln(jP
 1







if Vij = 1 and 0 otherwise
(A8)
As highlighted above, product quality in
uences the probability as well as the
level of trading TT. The econometric specication in the following Section is based
on equation (A3) which describes the selection process and on equation (A8) that
pictures the trade 
ows.
24Table A1: Variable description and sources
Variable Description Source
Xijz Import value (in 1000 US$) of bilateral trade 
ow
of tropical timber products z from exporter i to im-
porter j.
UN Comtrade
Vijz Dummy variable = 1 if bilateral trade 
ow of tropical
timber products z from exporter i to importer j > 0,
0 otherwise.
RTA Dummy variable = 1 if a regional trade agreement
between the two trading partners is in force, 0 oth-
erwise.
Baier et al. (2008); WTO
Distance Distance (in km) between the main cities of the two
trading partners.
CEPII
Contiguity Dummy variable = 1 if the two trading partners
share a common border, 0 otherwise.
CEPII
Comlanguage Dummy variable = 1 if the two trading partners
share the same language, 0 otherwise.
CEPII
Colony Dummy variable = 1 if the two trading partners have
ever had a colonial link, 0 otherwise.
CEPII
Comcolonizer Dummy variable = 1 if the two trading partners have
had a common colonizer after 1945, 0 otherwise.
CEPII
Di Dummy variable = 1 if exporter is ITTA-member, 0
otherwise.
Annex A and B of ITTA 1994
Dj Dummy variable = 1 if importer is ITTA-member, 0
otherwise.
Annex A and B of ITTA 1994
DiDj Dummy variable = 1 if both trading partners are
ITTA members, 0 otherwise.
Annex A and B of ITTA 1994
yj Importer's GDP per capita in constant year 2000
US$.
World Bank (WDI)
yi Exporters's GDP per capita in constant year 2000
US$.
World Bank (WDI)
25Table A2: Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System 1996 (HS1996)
Code Description
WOOD AND ARTICLES OF WOOD; WOOD CHARCOAL; CORK AND AR-
TICLES OF CORK; MANUFACTURES OF STRAW, OF ESPARTO OR OF
OTHER PLAITING MATERIALS; BASKETWARE AND WICKERWORK
44 WOOD AND ARTICLES OF WOOD; WOOD CHARCOAL
4403 Wood in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly
squared
Other, of tropical wood specied in subheading note 1 to this chapter:
440341 Dark red meranti, light red meranti and meranti bakau
440349 Other
4407 Wood sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed,
sanded or nger-jointed, of a thickness exceeding 6 mm
Of tropical wood specied in subheading note 1 to this chapter:
440724 Virola, mahogany (Swietenia spp.), imbuia and balsa
440725 Dark red meranti, light red meranti and meranti bakau
440726 White lauan, white meranti, white seraya, yellow meranti and alan
440729 Other
4408 Veneer sheets and sheets for plywood (whether or not spliced) and other
wood sawn lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or
nger-jointed, of a thickness not exceeding 6 mm
Of tropical wood specied in subheading note 1 to this chapter:
440831 Dark red meranti, light red meranti and meranti bakau
440839 Other
4412 Plywood, veneered panels and similar laminated wood
Plywood consisting solely of sheets of wood, each ply not exceeding 6 mm thickness:
441213 With at least one outer ply of tropical wood specied in subheading note 1 to this
chapter
Other, with at least one outer ply of non-coniferous wood:
441222 With at least one ply of tropical wood specied in subheading note 1 to this chapter
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Does going green pay o? The eect of an international environmental agreement
on tropical timber trade
Abstract
Trade-related measures aim to regulate side-eects in international environmental
agreements and are expected to positively in
uence the level of participation in the
agreements as well as their degree of stability. In this paper we examine one side-
eect of the 1994 International Tropical Timber Agreement - its impact on tropical
timber trade. We use a cross-sectional dataset on bilateral trade 
ows of tropical
timber that additionally contains information on trading partners' economic and
geographical characteristics. Our empirical specication is based on a gravity equa-
tion, which is estimated using Heckman's selection model to address the potentially
systematic selection of trading partners. We nd signicantly positive impacts of the
1994 ITTA on member countries' level of tropical timber trade. Furthermore, poor
exporter countries benet more from this trade enhancing eect than their richer
counterparts.
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